This opinion passing on a defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a plaintiff’s claims of willful infringement dealt with a couple of interesting issues regarding the necessary prerequisites for a claim of willful infringement.
Some patent cases conclude the trial phase of the case not with a trial before a jury, but with a post-trial bench trial on nonjury issues such as laches, inequitable conduct, or other equitable issues. This opinion reflects the court’s findings on the issue of equitable estoppel in a patent case, which was tried to the court following the jury trial.
Yes, there are still 1404 motions seeking transfer based on convenience, and this one in a case brought by Oyster Optics presents a current recitation of the relevant caselaw before denying the requested relief.
I had some people ask me last night at a Christmas party (because this is what we talk about at Christmas parties in Marshall) if Judge Payne’s opinion that I posted on yesterday assigning the burden with respect to marking issues analyzed the case under the Federal Circuit’s December 7 opinion in Arctic Cat v. Bombardier, No. 2017-1475. The answer is yes, it did.
And then there’s that pesky marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Under § 287(a), a patentee or other party selling a patented product under the patent must mark that product with the patent number to provide notice to the public that the product it may be pursuing is patented. (No, there is not a penalty for overuse of the letter “p”. Why do you ask?) If they don’t satisfy the marking statute, damages can be limited to the point that the word “presuit” will henceforth cause the patentholder uncontrolled crying fits. The issue of when a plaintiff has the burden of proving compliance with the marking statute at trial was the subject of an interesting order from across the street earlier today.
They’re not quite the intellectual thrill of a JMOL ruling, but court orders determining whether to enhance damages and award ongoing royalties are where the money is, literally speaking. A recent order awarding ongoing royalties by declining to enhance damages provided more information when enhancement is and isn’t appropriate.
A Marshall jury in Judge Roy Payne’s court returned a verdict Thursday in favor of Ericsson in a case brought against TCL Communications.
With In Re Cray clarifying to some extent when venue is proper based on the alleged existence of a regular and established place of business, cases are starting to get thumbs up or thumbs down on pending venue motions at an accelerating pace, providing additional analysis on where in the Cordis/Cray continuum they fit.
Like this one.
Earlier today Judge Rodney Gilstrap granted the motions to intervene in a patent infringement suit brought against a retailer by three suppliers. The motion was granted as an intervention as of right under FRCP 24, but the Court found intervention appropriate even under the standards for permissive intervention.
I’m sorry – I just can’t hear about a court “sitting in equity” without wondering whether everyone needs to reach in their briefcase and find their wigs. (I realize a few may already have them on, and guys, your secret – such as it is – is safe with me). That’s probably not quite what it looked like in Judge Mazzant’s courtroom in Sherman when he pressed “enter” to paste his electronic signature on the opinion in this interesting Lanham Act case dealing with remedies. But a good exposition of the law is always welcome, so let’s see what happened here.