A Marshall jury in Judge Robert W. Schroeder III’s court returned a split verdict on infringement yesterday in a case involving an Israeli defense contractor’s patents on broadband technology that has already seen one trip to the Federal Circuit on the TC Heartland improper venue issue.
Just got back from vacation with the herd and in the mad rush to get out didn’t get a post up on this verdict from Tyler in Judge Schroeder’s court which gave both sides something to cheer about.
I’ll be adding other posts during the day (because of course the first day back in the office after vacation is a leisurely one). There’s another verdict and we now have three weeks of filing data post TC Heartland to examine. And no, Collin isn’t possessed, but we are making him sleep with garlic flowers for a few weeks just, you know, in case.
Ever wonder what complete and total happiness looks like? Well, my youngest Parker finally getting to see the completely restored and illuminated starship Enterprise at the Smithsonian last month comes pretty close.
But something else that also comes pretty close is when you file a motion to dismiss a patent case, the plaintiff dismisses the case with prejudice and the Court stops them at the door and asks you if you’d like to get your costs and attorney’s fees back as well.
That was the case in this recent set of decisions by Magistrate Judge Love and Judge Schroeder in this Tyler case which outline some interesting issues with regard to the interplay between motions to dismiss and summary judgment, as well as voluntary dismissals.
Class actions are not the most common form of cat in the Eastern District of Texas, but they are filed from time to time. This case provides an interesting look at the standards applied to motions to certify a class, as well as to the standards applied by district judges reviewing reports and recommendations regarding class certification, as well as a thick block of analysis on the specific requirements of private securities fraud class actions as set forth in Amgen. If you’re addressing similar issues, the two opinions are worth a close study. If you’re not, this is an hour of your life you can keep.
The last of last week’s Marshall juries came back this week with a $44 million verdict in the antitrust case in Judge Trey Schroeder’s court. The case involved claims by plaintiffs who serviced or refurbished GE anesthesia machines, and as suits a seven day jury trial involved a 32 page verdict, analyzed below.
Congratulations again to plaintiff’s local counsel, and, uh, well, again, there’s no one local to send sympathies to on the losing side.
Yes, Mr. “Twin Peaks” Giant, it is happening again. Another 101 motion has been granted … in part. And even by the same judge (and almost the same day). In this case,
Two patents and six defendants – are the asserted claims invalid as ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) or not?
Well, yes, in part. In this case,
A few weeks after Judge Gilstrap’s order in September 2015 dismissing the 101 defendant eDekka litigation on 101 grounds, Magistrate Judge Love recommended granting a similar motion in the Rothschild Location Technologies cases on January 4, 2016 – a recommendation that Judge Schroeder adopted several weeks later. That litigation originally involved around three dozen defendants. Judge Schroeder recently denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in light of the “101 spring” line of cases from the Federal Circuit in 2016 (Enfish et al.) which did not affirm district courts’ decisions to dismiss cases on 101 grounds. In his opinion, Judge Schroeder
I mentioned previously that there’s really no “additur” by which a judge can scratch out the damages number awarded by a jury as insufficient under the evidence and increase it. While a trial court can effectively reduce a verdict via “remittuitur” or via JMOL/MNT practice, the reverse isn’t true. But to use an overused word, patent cases are exceptional in that judges do have the ability to “enhance” damage awards under 35 USC 284 where a jury has made a finding of willful infringement. Such was the case in
A key issue in motions to stay pending inter partes review is often whether a moving defendant is willing to agree that it will be bound by the statutory estoppel provisions of 35 USC 315 (C). In this case, the court had deferred ruling on the motion to stay until the defendant took a position as to whether it would agree to be stayed. In the attached order,