Tuesday I’m testifying before the Texas Legislature which believes that FRCP 12(b) motions are just the cat’s meow for deep-sixing cases early on, and Friday I’m posting a good example of why that’s not necessarily the case. This case arises out of a ANDA application filed by the Defendant to
I wouldn’t call Professor Arthur Miller’s often-quoted phrase more elegant, but it is clearly better that the mere “Twiqbal” at describing the effect of his former student Judge Payne’s report and recommendation last week in Bartonfalls v. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 2:16cv1127, which recommended dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under three patents against 11 defendants, with prejudice, i.e. no opportunity to replead, using only four paragraphs of analysis.
But the grounds for the dismissal were unique. In this case
Speaking (indirectly) about trial practice, Mark Knopfler that famously observed “some days you’re the windshield; some days you’re the bug.” What’s a morning catching up on recent cases without watching another argument for (or against) personal jurisdiction and plausibility play out, and see where but for the grace of God, I go … at least until later this afternoon. In this case, the defendant asserted a motion to dismiss for
You know that feeling when you open the closet door and everything falls out? It was sort of like that when I started looking at recent Twiqbal opinions today. I got the most significant one out this morning, but have been buried in the rest trying to decide which are worth posting on. But this is one. In this case,
Nope, the closet isn’t cleaned out yet. In this case, defendants in four of five consolidated cases filed Twiqbal motions, and Judge Payne addressed all four in a single order, Hellfighters-style. Actually, that’s not quite accurate – defendants’ principal argument was a lack of standing, but all also asserted failure to state a plausible claim. With respect to the first,
No, this isn’t a book review. I just couldn’t pass up the cover of this … interesting publication. On December 1, 2015, the authority governing the pleading standard for certain types of patent infringement claims changed. Prior to that date Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms controlled pleadings for direct patent infringement claims. But in cases filed after December 1, 2015, as well as “insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending,” the Iqbal/Twombly standard governs patent infringement pleadings. In the case I am discussing, the complaint was filed several weeks after the change, so there was no dispute that Twiqbal applied. The case is a patent one, and as is often the case, a Twiqbal motion was filed, but this opinion addresses the still relatively new issue of how Twiqbal applies to pleadings of direct infringement, as well as several claims dealing with allegations of indirect and willful infringement, as well as other issues. It also presents practitioners with a match set (attached below the analysis) of Judge Payne’s report and recommendations on the issue, and Judge Gilstrap’s subsequent order adopting the report and overruling the objections. The case is trebly important because it addresses both substantive and tactical considerations, indicating what practices regarding Twiqbal motions might be more better received than others.